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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 40Abstract
Small ￿rms often do not change their number of employees from
year to year. This paper investigates the role of adjustment costs and
indivisibility of labor in the employment stickiness of manufacturing
￿rms with less than 75 employees. When small ￿rms have to adjust
employment in units of at least one employee, indivisibility becomes an
important source of stickiness. A structural model of dynamic labor
demand with adjustment costs and indivisibility is estimated using
indirect inference on a panel of small French manufacturing ￿rms.
Adjustment cost are estimated to be very small. Indivisibility explains
around 50% of the stickiness of employment, adjustment costs explain
the other 50%.
Keywords: indivisibility, labor adjustment costs, employment, sticky
employment, indirect inference
JEL Classi￿cation Number: E24
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June 2006Non-technnical Summary
The number of employees employed by a small ￿rm has the tendency
to remain constant from one year to the other. This tendency to remain
constant can be explained by two factors. A ￿rst factor is the cost of em-
ployment adjustment. The second factor is the indivisibility of employment.
The main aim of the paper is to infer the role of ￿adjustment costs ￿versus
"indivisibility￿behind the stickiness of employment for small ￿rms and to
provide quantitative estimates on the relative importance of both of them.
The paper therefore ￿rst develops a theoretical structural model an of an im-
perfectly competitive ￿rm with costly employment adjustment. The model
parameters (the parameters determining the adjustment costs) are estimated
to ￿t the employment and output dynamics of a set of 1902 French manu-
facturing ￿rms. Once the structural parameter estimates are obtained it is
analyzed how much of the stickiness of employment is caused by adjustment
costs versus indivisibility.
For small ￿rms both factors are about of equal importance. Costs of
adjustment cause ￿rms not to react to small productivity (or demand) shocks.
Indivisibility of employment causes ￿rms with few employees to increase or
decrease their number of employees less frequently than ￿rms with a lot of
employees. Small shocks to demand or costs are not su¢ cient to induce ￿rms
with few employees to change the number of people working at the ￿rm. The
intuition for this ￿nding is that hiring or ￿ring a single employee represents
a much larger percentage of the total workforce (and therefore productive
capability) for a small ￿rm than for a large ￿rm so that larger shocks are
needed to warrant hiring or ￿ring one employee.
Two lessons for policymakers can be derived. Even the reduction of small
adjustment costs (legal severance payments, e.g.) will induce more ￿ exible
hiring and ￿ring in small ￿rms. Second, such a reduction can not overcome
the indivisibility problem small ￿rms face. A ￿ exible adjustment of hours
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This paper analyses the causes of employment stickiness at small manufac-
turing ￿rms. Employment at the ￿rm level can be sticky under certain types
of adjustment costs. It is well known that a ￿xed hiring or ￿ring cost (or
both) causes episodes of non-adjustment (see e.g. Hamermesh, 1989). In
the presence of ￿xed costs, it is optimal to wait until large enough shocks
occur before adjusting employment. There is empirical evidence that em-
ployment adjusts in a infrequent but lumpy fashion (e.g. Caballero, Engel
and Haltiwanger (1997)). A fact not often emphasized in the literature on
dynamic labor adjustment is the indivisibility of employment. Indivisibility
is potentially important for small ￿rms. Firing an employee for a ￿rm with 10
employees reduces 10% of the workforce whereas for a ￿rm of 1000 employees
this is only a 0.1% reduction. Even in the complete absence of hiring or ￿ring
costs one would expect the smaller ￿rm with 10 employees to show higher
employment stickiness as larger shocks are needed to get the same employ-
ment response of ￿ring or hiring one employee. In the words of Hamermesh
(1993) "many ￿rms are so small that these (=indivisibilities) become impor-
tant...In a small ￿rm experiencing a relatively small positive shock, hiring
an extra employee may reduce pro￿ts even ignoring the adjustment costs that
are incurred. " In other words, non-adjustment in the number of employees
might be optimal even in the complete absence of adjustment costs.
It is hard to overemphasize the importance of small ￿rms in the European
context. Of the approximately 140 million people, employed in the private
enterprise sector in the EU, 57% are employed by enterprises with less than
50 employees1. Small ￿rms are therefore major players in the aggregate real-
location of employment. In the empirical literature on dynamic labor demand
at the ￿rm or plant level2, indivisibility has received a lot less attention than
adjustment costs as a reason for stickiness of employment. Usually, in es-
timated models of dynamic labor demand, labor can adjust smoothly, i.e.
in in￿nitesimal amounts so that production functions and adjustment cost
1SMEs in Europe 2003, Observatory of European SMEs, European Commission. Pages
25-26.
2A large empirical literature estimate labor demand at the aggregate or industry level
where indivisibility is likely less of an issue. However, labor demand estimates based on
aggregate or industry level data are unlikely to lead to realistic estimates of adjustment
costs at the ￿rm or plant level due to aggregation. A summary of earlier dynamic labor
demand studies using ￿rm level data is given in Hamermesh and Pfann (1996).
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are large, however, can be far from the truth when ￿rms are small. This
paper takes indivisibility seriously and investigates when the di⁄erentiability
assumption is dropped and replaced with the assumption that labor can only
adjust in units (i.e. one, two, three, etc....). This allows to investigate the
role of adjustment cost and indivisibility simultaneously. Indivisibility is
likely to be especially important for small ￿rms when faced with negative
shocks. Imagine demand for the ￿rms output drops by 2% for both the ￿rm
with 10 employees and 1000 employees. The ￿rm of 1000 employees is seen
to ￿re 20 employees and the ￿rm of ten employees does not ￿re. Does the
￿rm with 10 employees face higher adjustment costs or does it simply face
indivisibility (2% of 10 employees is 0.2 employees)? The ￿rm with 1000
employees by ￿ring 20 employees reduced its workforce by 2%, i.e. a magni-
tude identical to the negative demand shock. For the ￿rm with 10 employees
however, ￿ring 1 employee would reduce its workforce by 10%, far too much
to be optimal for a reduction in demand of 2%. So in the complete absence
of adjustment costs, one would readily observe the large ￿rm to adjust its
workforce from year to year to accommodate demand shocks, whereas for
the small ￿rm employment would remain sticky. Ignoring the existence of
indivisibility would wrongly lead to the conclusion that the small ￿rm su⁄ers
from adjustment costs (in the number of employees). An alternative for the
￿rm with 10 employees would be to reduce working time (with reduced pay!)
of 2%, say 48 minutes for every worker on a workweek of 40 hours. Reduc-
tion of normal hours with reduced pay is however something that is observed
not that often (at least not in such a ￿ exible way). So where the ￿rm with
1000 employees likely can reduce production costs and production workers
with 2% more easily, this will likely not be the case for the ￿rm with 10
employees. The reverse however, reacting to positive shocks with overtime of
existing workers (with extra more than normal pay!) is generally more likely.
However overtime is generally an expensive solution.
The paper ￿rst shows that employment (i.e. the number of people working
at the ￿rm) is indeed sticky for small ￿rms. The main aim of the paper is to
infer the role of the "adjustment costs story" versus the "indivisibility- no-
adjustment cost story" behind the stickiness of employment for small ￿rms
and to provide quantitative estimates on the relative importance of both of
them. The paper remains in the spirit of the dynamic labor adjustment
literature and focuses and the adjustment in number of employees and not in
hours. Almost the entire literature on dynamic labor adjustment focuses on
7
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￿rm level is very hard to ￿nd. So also this paper in line with the literature
will maintain the common assumption that labour input into production
can be proxied by the number of employees. In the appendix it is shown that
relaxation of this assumption changes little of the main conclusions of the
paper.
Without a theoretical model that combines adjustment costs, indivisibil-
ity and shocks to labor demand it is very di¢ cult to disentangle the causes of
stickiness. The paper therefore ￿rst develops a theoretical structural model
incorporating all these elements. Using a large ￿rm dataset of small manu-
facturing ￿rms (all have less than 75 employees on average), the paper shows
that the smaller the ￿rm, the more likely its employment level will remain
stable from one year to the next. The stickiness is quite pronounced for small
￿rms and diminishes gradually as ￿rms become larger. The estimation of the
structural model shows that both adjustment costs and indivisibility explain
this monotonic relationship between stickiness and size. As small ￿rms em-
ploy a signi￿cant amount of the total labor force and produce a substantial
amount of aggregate value added (especially in Europe), their employment
stickiness is potentially important for the aggregate economy.
Being able to assess the relative importance between adjustment costs
and indivisibility is quite important for both policymakers and macro mod-
elers. For policy makers it is important to understand the extent to which
adjustment costs explain the employment stickiness. It has often been argued
that employment protection legislation and severance payments add to ￿ring
costs of ￿rms. High ￿ring costs would induce sticky employment behavior.
If ￿ring costs are at the center of the non-adjustment of small ￿rms, a case
could be made to policymakers to relax those cost as they create ine¢ ciencies
and output loss. Upon reduction of ￿ring costs, ￿rms should be seen both
to hire and ￿re more often. However, if indivisibility causes non-adjustment
of the employment level of small ￿rms, hiring and ￿ring will be little in￿ u-
enced upon a reduction of ￿ring costs. If indivisibility is at the center of
non-adjustment, it is likely that the ￿rm will try to adjust along other mar-
gins, such as hours worked of its workforce. To the extent that overtime is
expensive and reduction of time is regulated (or impossible), a relaxation of
overtime and reduction of time regulation might be more relevant for small
￿rms. It has to be noted however that stickiness (in terms of the number
of employees at the ￿rm) could actually increase when overtime and reduc-
tion of time regulation becomes more relaxed since ￿rms could adjust labour
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input more easily without adjusting their number of employees.Macro modelers should also be interested in employment stickiness and
the reasons behind it. In most of the large macro-literature on in￿ ation
in a New -Keynesian framework, employment adjustment costs are absent.
Firms adjust employment fully ￿ exibly without any adjustment costs. How-
ever recently there has been renewed interest in developing the implications
of lumpy adjustment in employment in a general equilibrium setting. King
and Thomas (2003) develop a model that incorporates ￿xed employment ad-
justment costs at the individual ￿rm level and that when aggregated resem-
bles partial adjustment for employment. In recent empirical work, Tilmann
(2005) has argued that adding adjustment cost to labor can greatly improve
the empirical ￿t of the forward looking Phillips curve in the Euro area. Un-
derstanding the magnitude and form of the adjustment costs and the possible
other reasons such as magnitude of shocks or indivisibilities at the ￿rm level
is therefore also relevant for macro economics. Also if most of the stickiness
stems from small ￿rms, modelling heterogeneous ￿rms might be important.
In this paper the "adjustment cost" story versus the "indivisibility-no
adjustment cost" story for non-adjustment of employment are investigated
for a pro￿t maximizing ￿rm. This is done in a number of steps. First, a
theoretical model of optimal employment decision is developed under the
presence of adjustment costs. The adjustment cost literature has convinc-
ingly argued that the traditional convex cost are not su¢ cient to explain
employment changes. The model therefore allows a relatively broad set of
possible adjustment costs, namely ￿xed, linear and convex and also allows
for di⁄erences in the cost of increasing versus reducing employment. The
￿rm has to hire employees in complete units and therefore the model is not
di⁄erentiable in employment and has to be solved numerically. Second, the
model is estimated by indirect inference (Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault,
1993) and crucially the shock process is estimated simultaneously with the
adjustment cost parameters. The indirect inference methodology essentially
estimates the structural parameters of the model by matching the moments
of the data with the moments of the model. This paper therefore goes beyond
most of this literature in estimating a fully structural model of employment
adjustment3. The model parameters are estimated to ￿t the employment
3Another paper that estimates a fully structural model on US data is Cooper, Halti-
wanger and Willis (2003), They however do not concentrate on the stickiness of employ-
ment as the plant data concerns large plants of generally more than 500 employees.
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once the structural parameter estimates are obtained it is analyzed how much
of the stickiness of employment is caused by adjustment costs versus indivis-
ibility.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section two, a brief
overview of the employment adjustment literature is given, in section three
the data is described, in section four and ￿ve the theoretical model is devel-
oped and some model simulations are provided to give insight into the model.
Sections six and seven provide the estimation method and results. Section 8
concludes.
2 Employment adjustment: the literature
A large empirical and theoretical literature has investigated the dynamics of
employment at the ￿rm or plant level.4 The dynamics of employment at the
￿rm level are usually explained by positing certain structures of adjustment
costs. If adjustment costs are convex, employment will adjust frequently in
small amounts but not in large amounts. The convex (and symmetric in
hiring and ￿ring) adjustment costs are the standard assumption of the early
literature on dynamic labor demand (Sargent, 1978, Shapiro, 1986).
On the contrary, if adjustment costs are ￿xed or linear, employment
adjusts infrequently and in large amounts. Bertola and Saint-Paul (1994)
provide a theoretical model of linear adjustment costs. They show that both
hiring and ￿ring are less frequent when e.g. ￿ring costs are increased. Hamer-
mesh (1989) using monthly data on 7 manufacturing plants ￿nds that adjust-
ment costs in labor are best described by ￿xed costs. He ￿nds further that
plants production workers remain fairly constant over time, except for large
changes when also output changes in large amounts. Davis and Haltiwanger
4In contrast to the paper here, a lot of the earlier empirical work on employment
dynamics at the ￿rm level using panel data does not provide direct estimates of adjustment
costs. Rather in the early work the emphasis is on the dynamics of employments where
in the estimates of the dynamic employment regressions it is impossible to retrieve the
structural adjustment cost parameters. Early examples are e.g. Arellano and Bond (1991)
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interval [-.05,0.05] They unfortunately don￿ t specify how high the percentage
on zero adjustment is, so the 25% is an upper bound of the stickiness consid-
ered in this paper. Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997) ￿nd that a large
number of plants in the US (in the LRD data) choose not to adjust their
employment, even when shortages are large. Varejao and Portugal (2003)
report that in a large sample of Portuguese plants 75% of the plants do not
adjust employment from one quarter to the next. In a study on labor adjust-
ment in Norwegian plants Nilsen et al. (2003) allow for ￿xed costs and ￿xed
cost as function of size. They ￿nd ￿xed cost unrelated to plant size, so that
inaction is larger for small ￿rms.
Overall, the consensus of the literature thus far seems to be that adjust-
ment of employment can not be explained by convex cost alone, one also
needs ￿xed or linear costs. Second, adjustment costs are generally asym-
metric (e.g. Pfann and Palm, 1993); where depending on the country, time
period and sample sometimes hiring is more expensive than ￿ring or the
other way around. A summary of the literature up to the early nineties is
given by Hamermesh and Pfann (1996).
In this paper the dynamics of labor adjustment on a set of French ￿rms
is investigated. A number of earlier papers have estimated the adjustment
costs for French ￿rms. Goux et al. (2001) use a panel of 915 French manu-
facturing ￿rms for which they can measure the number of hirings and ￿rings
for inde￿nite and ￿xed term contract workers separately. They estimate
the costs of employment adjustment for these two types of workers using a
dynamic labor demand model with quadratic convex adjustment costs. For
inde￿nite contract workers they ￿nd ￿ring cost to be much higher than hiring
costs (around 40 times higher) . Their estimates unfortunately only allow
to make these comparative statements. They do not allow to measure the
absolute amount of adjustment costs. They also ￿nd that it is practically
costless to adjust workers on ￿xed time contracts. Using survey data on ac-
tual severance payments and actual costs (such as training hours, expenses
on job advertising, etc.) upon hiring, Abowd and Kramarz (2003) provide
an analysis of hiring and ￿ring costs for French ￿rms. They conclude that
for permanent contracts, the cost of hiring are much lower than the cost of
￿ring. However the highest cost of ￿ring are associated with collective termi-
5The LRD or Longitudinal Research Database, is a database from the US Census
Bureau that contains detailed company-level statistics.
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are mostly relevant for larger ￿rms not for the ￿rms in the dataset used here,
where reductions in employment of 10 persons are very rare. Based on two
cross-sections Kramarz and Michaud (2004) revisit the ￿ndings of Abowd
and Kramarz (2003). Again they ￿nd that collective terminations have the
highest costs. They also ￿nd hiring cost to be small, for instance they men-
tion that in two surveys of French ￿rms that hire workers respectively 49%
(for 1992) and 62% (for 1996) of the ￿rms declare a zero hiring cost . It is
hard to tell in advance the size of hiring or ￿ring cost as most of these costs
are hard to observe directly. In principle, in the case of hiring they include
job advertising, interview cost and training cost of the employee and the cost
of reorganizing work. Likewise, the cost of reducing employment includes
besides legal severance payments, the cost of helping employee ￿nding new
job, and other costs. According to the OECD (OECD,2005), employment
protection legislation is relatively strict in France. For permanent contracts
(the standard contract in the law) dismissal procedures are highly restrictive
in the sense that it is di¢ cult to ￿re someone for economic reasons only. How-
ever, although it might be di¢ cult to ￿re someone, legal severance payments
are relatively low. For instance they amount only to less than 3 months of
wage in case of a dismissal for economic reasons for someone with 15 years
of seniority in a ￿rm. Temporary contracts are much less restrictive, but
however are restricted in their use. However Abowd and Kramarz (2003)
argue that temporary contracts are the more common method of hiring, e.g.
up to 80% of all hirings in 1992 according to their data, exactly to avoid the
costs associated with terminating permanent contracts. Overall, the ￿ndings
of the French literature suggest that hiring costs are likely low and ￿ring
cost are mostly high for collective terminations and for employees on indef-
inite term contracts. However they are low for ￿xed term contracts. The
literature also suggests that ￿xed term contracts are therefore the preferred
choice for hiring new employees. Recent estimates for the US suggest very
low adjustment cost for labor (Hall, 2004 on industry level data) (Cooper,
Haltiwanger and Willis, 2003 on ￿rm level data).
An alternative explanation for the stickiness of employment is provided
by indivisibility. However, the empirical literature on dynamic labor demand
has not given much attention to this issue. This has naturally been the case
as the data used in most of the literature have considered plants or ￿rms
larger than those considered here. E.g. in the work by Caballero, Engel and
Haltiwanger (1997) and Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis (2003) plants are
12
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of indivisibilities. Nilsen et al. (2003) mention indivisibilities as a potential
explanation of non-adjustment, however dismiss the idea as "less plausible
for plants of more than 25 workers".
3 Data
This paper exploits the annual accounts of 1902 small French manufac-
turing ￿rms. The employment, sales and pro￿t data is obtained from the
AMADEUS database. The yearly employment level of these ￿rms (in num-
ber of employees) are observed over the period 1995-2003, i.e. 9 years. As
is the case with many databases used in the adjustment literature, the gross
hiring and ￿ring within the year are unknown so only the net change in the
number of employees from year to year can be observed. All manufacturing
￿rms have more than 10 and less than 75 employees on average over the
period. The data are trimmed to remove outliers (see the appendix for the
details about trimming.)
A limitation of the study (in which it is similar to most dynamic labor
adjustment studies) is the absence of hours worked data. To the extent that a
￿xed employment level can produce di⁄erent labor inputs by working more or
less hours over the year, the stickiness measured by employment level might
be overstating the stickiness of labor input. However aggregate yearly manu-
facturing data suggests that adjustment, over a year, takes place in terms of
number of people working rather than hours. Over the period 1995-2003, the
simple correlation of aggregate value added growth in manufacturing with
employment growth is 0.32, while the correlation with total hours worked
is only 0.16. Abraham and Houseman (1994) provide evidence that in Ger-
many, France and Belgium ￿rst hours are adjusted rather than employment,
at least in the short run. They ascribe this to costly employment adjust-
ment. Aggregate measures of the number of hours worked per employed
person show a trend decline in France by 8.5% over the period 1995-2003
(i.e. from 1558 hours to 1431 hours) (OECD, 2005). Hours declined every
year except 1996.
Although one can not observe how many plants these ￿rms have, consid-
ering they all have less than 75 employees, it is likely that most have just
1 plant. Despite what one might think, small ￿rms are quite important in
13
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statistical o¢ ce, in manufacturing, ￿rms below 20 employees produce around
10 percent of manufacturing output and ￿rms between 20 and 250 employ-
ees produce another 25%. The numbers for services are much higher 30.4%
and 22.2 % respectively.6Employment stickiness for these ￿rms is therefore
also likely of importance for the aggregate economy.
For the purpose of analysis the ￿rms are split into ￿ve size groups ac-
cording to the average number of employees over the period. The ￿ve size
groups are de￿ned using the following intervals ([10,15[, [15,25[ ,[25,35[,[35,50[
,[50,75[ ). Although the intervals are chosen somewhat arbitrary they are
large enough so that there are enough ￿rms in each group and small enough
so that the ￿rms in each group can be considered to be of similar size. The
number of ￿rms in each group are respectively: 353, 532, 302, 448 and 267.
For the purpose of the analysis in this paper all statistics are calculated as
across ￿rm averages. 7
Figure 1 depicts the frequency distribution of the absolute (i.e. num-
ber of people) yearly employment changes for each ￿rm group. A number
of stylized facts can be seen looking at the distributions. One of the more
striking features of the employment changes distribution is the frequent ab-
sence of adjustment, the mode of the distribution is always at zero for every
group. Otherwise said, there are many periods in which employment does
not adjust from one year to the other, i.e. stays ￿xed. The frequency of
non-adjustment is 40% for ￿rms in the ￿rst size group of 10 to 15 employees,
implying that an average ￿rm keeps employment ￿xed from one year to next
in 40% of the years. This frequency of non-adjustment gradually declines
and is 16% for the largest size group (50 to 75 employees). These numbers
are similar to those found by Nilsen et al. (2003) on yearly Norwegian data.
They ￿nd, for instance, that for plants of 25 workers or less the frequency
on non-adjustment is 25%. So the ￿rst stylized fact is that the frequency of
6See table NATTEF09204.xls from INSEE website. By comparison, for the US , plants
with less than 100 employees represent about 25% of employment in the manufacturing
sector (Table IV, Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992)
7Each statistic is ￿rst calculated for each individual ￿rm over the period 1995-2003 after
which the average (accross ￿rms) of these statistics is calculated. For example, suppose
the dataset consists of 3 ￿rms, where ￿rm 1 has a frequency of nonadjustment of 1/8, ￿rm
2 of 2/8 and ￿rm 3 of 4/8. The sample frequency would be 1/3*(3/8+2/8+4/8)=3/8.
14
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June 2006Figure 2: Autocorrelation of employment growth
inaction is high for all groups but gradually declines for larger ￿rms. Second,
￿rms do not adjust employment in large absolute amounts when they adjust.
On the contrary, beside non-adjustment, adjusting employment upward or
downward by just 1 employee is the most frequent, adjusting 2 employees is
second most frequent, and so on. This seems initial evidence against large
￿xed costs, as such ￿xed cost would favour adjustment of employment in
large amounts. Third, ￿rms adjust approximately as frequently downward
as they do upward.
Figure 2 shows the average autocorrelation of employment growth at lags
one, two and three with 90% con￿dence bands (i.e. 90% of the ￿rm level
autocorrelations are within that band). In all size groups this autocorrelation
16
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is negative at all lags. High employment growth periods are followed by
low periods of growth. The frequency of non-adjustment and the negative
autocorrelation of employment are a ￿rst is indication that a model of partial
adjustment with only quadratic adjustment cost is unlikely to ￿t the data.
Negative autocorrelation is expected when large adjustments are followed
by non-adjustment. The average negative autocorrelation of employment
growth at the ￿rm level coincides with negative autocorrelation of output
growth as depicted in Figure 3.
In the next section a theoretical model is developed of a pro￿t maximizing
￿rm. The aim is to estimate the parameters of the model such that they
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 640
June 2006match as closely as possible the features described above, the distribution of
employment changes and the dynamics of employment and output.
4 The model
Consider an imperfectly competitive ￿rm with costly employment adjust-
ment. The ￿rm￿ s real output is given by the constant returns to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function:





where Ai is the productivity level of ￿rm i and ait a productivity shock.
The productivity shock is exogenous and follows an AR(1) process
ait = ￿aait￿1 + ￿it; (2)
where ￿it is distributed normal with mean zero and variance ￿2
￿:
The ￿rm can adjust its number of employees Lit with a cost of adjustment














with Ih(￿Lit) = 1 if ￿Lit > 0 and Ih(￿Lit) = 0 otherwise, and Ir(￿Lit) =
1 if ￿Lit < 0 and Ir(￿Lit) = 1 otherwise. The function nests di⁄erent cases
of adjustment costs considered in the literature. First, costs are allowed to
depend on the direction of change of employment , i.e. increase or reduction
of employment matters so that cost asymmetries are allowed. Second, the
cost of change in employment is a function of a ￿xed part, a linear part and
a convex (quadratic) part. 8 The production factor Kit has no adjustment
costs and can be adjusted within the period. Kit should be considered here
broadly as all other factors of production that can be adjusted within the
period.
8In the literature, there are also other types of adjustment costs considered. E.g.
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with 0 < ￿ < 1. The price elasticity of demand is equal to 1
￿￿1.
So output times price is given by pitYit = Y
￿￿1
it pi0Yit = pi0Y
￿
it: Real pro￿ts9






￿ ￿ WLit ￿ rKit ￿ C(Lit￿1;Lit) (6)
The ￿rm maximizes the present value of the future ￿ ow of real pro￿ts
discounted at a rate ￿. Pro￿ts can be normalized by the wage and after
maximizing out the ￿ exible production factor Kit the value function of the
￿rm can be written as function of employment and the productivity shock
only.10













i is just equal to Ai multiplied by a constant 11 ,C￿(Lit￿1;Lit)
is equal to C(Lit￿1;Lit) up to a normalization by W: Adjustment costs can
therefore be measured in terms of yearly real wages which are normalized
to 1.
The value function has two state variables, current period productivity
shock ait and last periods employment Lit￿1 . Employment this period is
the only control variable. The value function depends on twelve structural
parameters:￿ = {￿;￿;A￿
i￿;￿a;￿￿;Hf;Hl;Hc;F f;F l;F c}. The 6 parameters
9Instead of productivity schocks one could alternatively model demand schocks leading
to an identical pro￿t function.
10The model assumes a constant real wage e⁄ectively assuming real wage rigidity. This
implies that all ￿ uctuations in employment are subscribed to productivity (or demand)
shocks At the ￿rm level it is likely that employment ￿ uctuations indeed stem mostly from
productivity or demand shocks.
11The constant is a function of Ai;r;W;￿;￿:
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The productivity shock process is governed by the two parameters f￿a;￿￿g.
The e⁄ect of indivisibility
The indivisibility in the model is implied by Lit taking only values in
the set of natural numbers f1;2;3;::g. When employment is indivisible, i.e.
when it can only change in multiples of 1, ￿rms will optimally not adjust
employment in the face of small shocks even in the complete absence of
adjustment cost. To see this, consider the static employment problem with
indivisibility of labor. Indivisibility in employment creates ￿ jumps￿in the
marginal product of labor. Without indivisibility, ￿rms will employ labor
up to point where the marginal product of the last employee is equal to
that employees wage. However, with indivisibility, the marginal product of
the last employee will be larger (or at best equal) than his/her wage. The
marginal product of the next (not hired employee) lies below its wage. If
the gap between the two marginal products is large enough, small shocks to
the marginal product (e.g. productivity or demand shocks) will not lead to
extra hiring or ￿ring. The indivisibility can be seen as a real rigidity. It is
optimal for the ￿rm not to react (with hiring or ￿ring) to small shocks to the
marginal product.
The model makes the implicit assumption that the employment level also
determines the level of employment input. Otherwise said yearly hours are
￿xed in this model. To a certain extent this will provide a maximal poten-
tial e⁄ect of indivisibility. Outside of the model are two possible ways of
adjustment. First, ￿rms could adjust by adding part-time workers. Say a
￿rm with 10 full time employees could hire 0.2 workers if it could ￿nd a
worker for 1 day per week. To the extent that this worker also has hiring or
￿ring cost this might be too costly. Alternatively, workers could do overtime.
However, overtime generally pays a premium in France of about 25% (10%
for ￿rms with less than 20 employees) making overtime quickly prohibitively
expensive as a solution to increase yearly hours. Including those two mar-
gins in the model and investigating them would entail a much more detailed
dataset that includes hours worked, hours paid (overtime and regular time)
and employment levels in part-time versus full-time employees.
12One should write Hf￿;Hl￿;H￿c;R￿f;Rl￿;Rc￿ as they are the original parameter nor-
malized by W. However from now on the * is removed from the notation for convenience
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To understand the employment dynamics of the above model the results of
a few simple parameterizations is presented in this section. By setting all six
adjustment cost parameters Hf;Hl;Hc;F f;F l;F c equal to zero except one
parameter, one can distinguish 6 baseline adjustment cost models: the ￿xed
hiring cost model, the linear hiring cost model, the convex hiring cost model,
the ￿xed ￿ring cost model, the linear ￿ring cost model and the convex ￿ring
cost model. The model without any adjustment costs is compared with these
six basic adjustment cost models to illustrate the e⁄ect di⁄erent adjustment
cost have on the dynamics of employment.
Figure 4 shows how the policy function of the six adjustment cost models
look like at the steady state employment13. On each graph in ￿gure 4 the
policy function of the adjustment cost model is shown (in bold) together
with the policy function in the absence of adjustment costs. The policy
function describes the employment change as a function of the shock ait.The
parameterization for this ￿gure is A￿
i =2.297, ￿￿ =0.0113 ,￿a =0 ,￿=0.887
and the adjustment cost parameters Hf;F f are set consecutively equal to
0.10 and Hl;Hc;F f;F l;F c are set consecutively equal to 0.05. Steady state
employment of the non-adjustment model is 61 employees.
A number of facts can be seen. First the staircase pattern of the no-
adjustment cost policy function is due to indivisibility, employment has
to change in natural numbers f1;2;3;::g. Second, adjustment costs have
two-sided e⁄ects. I.e. hiring costs lead also to non-￿ring in the face of
small negative shocks and ￿ring costs also lead to non-hiring in the face of
small positive shocks. The reason is simply that shocks are temporary so
that current hiring implies expected future ￿ring and current ￿ring implies
expected future hiring. Fixed hiring costs cause the ￿rm to not react to small
positive and (small) negative shocks (i.e. the employment change is zero) and
react once shocks become large enough. Linear hiring costs have a similar
no reaction to small shocks e⁄ect. However in addition when adjustment
takes place it occurs in smaller amounts than the non adjustment model for
a given shock. Convex hiring cost also ￿rms don￿ t react to small shocks and
react also less than the ￿xed and linear cost models to larger shocks. It is
notable that the convex cost model also small shocks ￿rms do not change
13Note that the steady state employment level is di⁄erent depending on the adjust-
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justment cost models
employment. The convex hiring schedule is actually identical to the linear
hiring cost schedule up to a certain level of the shock. After that react with
smaller adjustments towards large shocks than linear hiring cost model.
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Frequency std. dev. autocorr.
non adjust. +1 empl. -1 empl. +5 empl. -5 empl. empl. growth empl. growth
Data* 0.40 0.17 0.16 0.0035 0.0057 0.13 -0.13
no adj. costs 0.27 0.20 0.19 0.0039 0.0071 0.13 -0.16
Hf= 0:01 0.43 0.05 0.17 0.0057 0.0053 0.13 -0.14
Hl= 0:01 0.44 0.17 0.16 0.0032 0.0032 0.11 -0.08
Hc= 0:01 0.42 0.32 0.15 0 0.0025 0.09 -0.01
F f= 0:01 0.43 0.19 0.04 0.0039 0.0085 0.13 -0.13
F l= 0:01 0.43 0.17 0.16 0.0039 0.0028 0.10 -0.05
F c= 0:01 0.40 0.15 0.31 0.0032 0 0.08 0.02
The data are for comparison from group 1 , [10,15[ employees
The policy functions shown above tell what happens after a shock, how-
ever do not provide insight into how the distribution of employment changes
will look like if one simulates the model for a large set of ￿rms. Table 1
contains the outcome of a set of simulations of the model (353 ￿rms for 9
years) again under di⁄erent scenarios for the adjustment cost parameters.
I.e. the 6 basic models are simulated. Each time the adjustment cost para-
meter is set equal to 0.01.(The parameterization for table 1 is A￿
i =1.7399,
￿￿ =0.0147 ,￿a =0.8999 ,￿=0.8912, which are equal to the estimated para-
meters for group 1) It is noteworthy to see what this implies. For instance
consider hiring costs. For all three hiring cost models (￿xed, linear, convex)
changing employment by 1 employee will costs 1% of a yearly wage. However
the hiring of two employees will still cost 1% for the ￿xed cost model whereas
it will cost 2% for the linear and 4% for the convex cost model.
Table 1 compares the frequency of non-adjustment, the frequency of
adding (reducing) by 1 or 5 employees, the standard deviation of employ-
ment growth and the autocorrelation of employment.
The ￿rst ￿nding that can be derived from the simulation exercise is that
all adjustment costs increase the frequency of non adjustment compared to
the non-adjustment case. The frequency of non-adjustment is lowest in
the absence of adjustment costs. However, importantly, even in the no-
adjustment cost model the frequency of non-adjustment is not zero. It is still
27%. This is entirely due to indivisibility of employment. Non surprisingly,
the frequency of hiring 1 employee is lowest in the case of ￿xed cost, while
it is highest in the case of convex hiring adjustment costs. Symmetrically,
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in the case of convex ￿ring cost. The table also illustrates the well known
e⁄ect of convex costs to reduce the frequency of large adjustments. Again,
one-sided costs generally reduce the frequency of adjustment at both sides.
Employment growth is most volatile in the absence of adjustment costs and
least volatile in the presence of convex costs. Also, the autocorrelation of em-
ployment is lowest (i.e. most negative) in the absence of adjustment costs.
The e⁄ect of linear adjustment costs are usually somewhat between ￿xed and
convex costs.
6 Estimation method
The structural parameters of the model are estimated using the indirect
inference method as explained in Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993).





Lit = f(Lit￿1;ait;￿) (11)
ait = ￿aait￿1 + ￿it (12)
where ￿ ={￿;￿;A￿
i￿;￿a;￿￿;Hf;Hl;Hc;F f;F l;F c}.
The estimation of ￿ consist of a number of steps. In a ￿rst step, for
a given set of parameter values ￿ the value function above is solved using
value function iteration. (see e.g. Judd 1998, page 412). The state space
of employment is discrete and consists of a subset of the natural numbers14
The AR(1) productivity shock process is transformed into a discrete Markov
process on a very ￿ne grid of 51 points using Tauchen (1986). The solution
gives the policy function, i.e. the function f(Lit￿1;ait;￿) (and immediately
also fy; f￿). Given the solution of the model and initial condition Lit = L0,
it is possible to simulate values of b S ={b Lit; b Yit; b ￿it;:::b Lit+9; b Yit+9; b ￿it+9gN
i=1,
i.e. to simulate an arti￿cial dataset, where N is the number of ￿rms in the
dataset.15 This simulation is done drawing simulated values of a standard
14The upper bounds on the employment state space should be wide enough so that the
solution is not in￿ uenced by them.
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i=1:
On both the actual data and the simulated data a set of moments (in the
case here there are 21 moments) {MjN g21
j=1 and {c MjN (￿)g21
j=1respectively is
calculated.




[M1N￿c M1N (￿) M2N￿c M2N (￿):::M21N￿c M21N(￿)]￿ (13)
[ M1N￿c M1N(￿) M2N￿c M2N (￿):::M21N￿c M21N(￿)]
0 (14)
where ￿ is a positive de￿nite matrix. For the estimation the identity
matrix is used. The moments taken cover both the distribution of the em-
ployment adjustments as the dynamics of employment and output. First, one
would want the estimated model to match the distribution of employment
adjustment as depicted in Figure 1, i.e. the frequency distribution over the
range [-5,+5]. This gives 11 moments (i.e. the frequency of an adjustment of
-5 employees, -4 etc. up to +5 employees). The distribution of employment
changes however does not reveal the dynamics of employment adjustment
across time. To that extent 3 additional moments are calculated, the auto-
correlation of employment growth (in logs) at lags 1, 2 and 3. To also match
the dynamics of output, autocorrelation of output growth (in logs) at lag 1,
2 , 3 are calculated as well. Finally, 3 other moments are added: the average
level of employment, the average level of pro￿ts (divided by total wages) and
the standard deviation of employment growth.
To avoid estimating too many parameters, the discount rate ￿ is set equal
to 0.93 throughout the whole exercise. Likewise ￿ is not estimated but is set
equal to 0.33 throughout. This leaves 10 parameters to estimate.
7 Results
For each of the size groups the model above is estimated. The ￿ve esti-
mated models (one for each group of ￿rms) ￿t the data very closely. The
estimated moments are very close to the data moments for each of the ￿ve es-
timated models. Figure 5 compares the frequency distribution of employment
changes, the autocorrelation of employment growth and of sales between the
estimated models and the data. Table 2 compares the data moments with
the moments of the estimated model for the average employment level (in
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logs), the standard deviation of employment growth, the standard deviation
of output growth and the pro￿t margin.
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[10,15[ [15,25[ [25,35[ [35,50[ [50,75[
av. empl (logs) model 2.50 2.93 3.38 3.76 4.11
av. empl (logs) data 2.49 2.95 3.38 3.73 4.11
st. dev. empl growth model 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08
st. dev. empl growth data 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09
st. dev. outp. growth model 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09
st. dev. outp. growth data 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
pro￿t margin model 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.19
pro￿t margin data 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.19
The structural parameters of the model can essentially be divided into
two subgroups. The ￿rst group are the production and demand parame-
ters {A￿;￿;￿;￿￿} . The second group are the adjustment cost parameters
{Hf;Hl;Hc;F f;F l;F c}. The production and demand parameter estimates
are presented in Table 3a . They have all very small standard errors (not
reported).
Table 3a Structural Parameters Estimates
Production and demand
Size classes A￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
Class 1 [10,15[ 1:74 0:89 0:90 0:01
Class 2 [15,25[ 2:09 0:87 0:88 0:01
Class 3 [25,35[ 2:12 0:88 0:55 0:01
Class 4 [35,50[ 2:43 0:87 0:56 0:01
Class 5 [50,75[ 2:30 0:89 0:77 0:01
All parameters are signi￿cant at the 99% level
In the theoretical model, holding the other parameters constant, an in-
crease in the parameter A￿ (which is a function of the productivity level)
will increase the steady state size of the ￿rm. It is therefore not surprising
that it is generally estimated to be larger for the larger ￿rm groups than the
smaller ￿rm groups. The estimates of the demand curve parameter ￿ are
very similar across ￿rm groups (in the range 0.86 to 0.89). They imply an
elasticity of demand, between 7 and 9. This is quite close to other estimates
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Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) ￿nd an elasticity of 7.88 and argue that this
estimate is quite plausible. The autocorrelation of the productivity shocks
is determined by ￿. For all size groups productivity shocks are highly posi-
tively autocorrelated with an estimate of ￿ ranging from 0.55 to 0.90. The
standard deviation of productivity shocks ￿it are also similar in size across
groups. The standard deviation is around 0.01.
The estimates of the adjustment cost parameters are presented in Table
3b. The adjustment cost parameters estimates imply small adjustment costs
in absolute terms. Contrary to what the non-adjustment frequencies might
have suggested, the point estimates of the ￿xed hiring costs are very small
(and sometimes even negative). The smallest ￿rm group (10,15 employees)
has the largest (and signi￿cant) ￿xed cost parameter estimate at 0.0045,
implying a ￿xed cost of 0.45% of a yearly wage. Otherwise said, imagine a
yearly wage of 50000 euro, this would imply a ￿xed hiring cost of 225 euro.
The point estimates of the linear and quadratic hiring costs are also very
small. Group 5 has the largest (and signi￿cant) estimate of linear hiring
costs at 0.2% of a yearly wage per hired worker. Group 3 has the largest
convex cost parameter estimate at 0.0003 implying a convex cost of 0.03%
per worker hired (squared). Also, the ￿ring cost parameter estimates are
generally not large, they are of the same order of magnitude as the hiring
cost parameter estimates. For each given ￿rm group, not all cost parameters
are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This implies that the model seemingly
does not need 6 parameters to ￿t the data well. Looking at the individual
parameters however is misleading as the total cost of hiring or ￿ring consists
of the sum of a ￿xed, a linear and a convex part. What matters to the ￿rm
is to the total cost of hiring or ￿ring. E.g. it is not because point estimates
of some ￿xed costs parameters are sometimes negative that total costs are
negative as total costs are the sum of ￿xed, linear and convex costs! To
understand what the individual coe¢ cients imply in terms of the total cost
curve, Table 4 presents the costs of increasing or decreasing (in terms of 1
yearly wage) employment by 1 or 5 employees. The numbers in table 4
rea¢ rm the message of the individual point estimates namely that hiring
and ￿ring cost are not large. Hiring or ￿ring 1 employee is not very costly
and is between -0.2% and 0.5 % of a yearly wage for hiring and 0.1% and
0.8% for ￿ring. Firing 5 employees costs between 0.4 and 4.2% of a yearly
wage bill. Hiring 5 employees costs between -0.6% and 1.2% of a yearly wage
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bill.Why are estimated hiring and ￿ring costs so low? With respect to hiring
cost the evidence of Kramarz and Michaud (2004) also mentioned above sug-
gest that around 50% of the ￿rms declare a complete absence of hiring costs.
Interestingly, Kramarz and Michaud (2004) in their estimations also ￿nd that
￿xed hiring costs are very small and even negative on average. This is con-
sistent with the ￿nding of very low hiring costs in this paper. With respect
to ￿ring costs, a possible explanation is the use of temporary contracts. Al-
though the type of contract is not observed in the dataset used here, Abowd,
Corbel and Kramarz (1997) state that for France two-thirds of all hiring is on
short-term contracts and more than half of separations are due to the ending
of these short-term contracts. Goux et al. (2001) note that in 1992, about
80% of all hirings in private ￿rms were made through ￿xed-term contracts.
Despite legal restrictions on short time contracts, the numbers above sug-
gest that they are used quite often in France. The ￿ndings of Goux (2001),
Kramarz and Michaud (2004) and Abowd and Kramarz (2003) suggest that
hiring and ￿ring on ￿xed term contract has low adjustment costs. Goux et
al (2001) argue that European employers can now bypass the regulations of
dismissals by o⁄ering ￿xed-term instead of inde￿nite-term contract. Also,
small ￿rms might be less likely to give severance payments above those re-
quired by law (which are low) than large ￿rms. The low levels of hiring and
￿ring cost might therefore not be so surprising after all. Evidence from other
countries also suggests that labor adjustment costs might be low. Cooper,et
al. also ￿nd evidence of very small quadratic adjustment costs for the US.
The ￿nding that absolute adjustment costs are low does not imply they
are unimportant for the dynamics of employment. Even small adjustment
cost can have large implications for the dynamics of employment (In the
same vain that small menu costs can have large e⁄ects on pricing and output
(Mankiw, 1985) ).The high elasticity of demand implies that the marginal
pro￿ts are sensitive to small changes in costs. This implies that small adjust-
ment costs can have large e⁄ects. Especially the e⁄ect on the frequency of
non-adjustment might be quite large. A (seemingly) small adjustment cost
can make the di⁄erence between hiring or not hiring (or ￿ring and not ￿ring).
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Size classes Hf Hl Hc F f F l F c
Class 1 [10,15[ 0:0045 0:0000 0:0000 0:0030 0:0007 ￿0:0001
Class 2 [15,25[ 0:0016 -0:0011 ￿0:0001 0:0028 0:0002 0:0001
Class 3 [25,35[ ￿0:0016 0:0012 0:0003 0:0024 0:0025 0:0011
Class 4 [35,50[ ￿0:0006 ￿0:0015 0:0001 0:0002 0:0077 0:0001
Class 5 [50,75[ 0:0001 0:0020 0:0001 ￿0:0007 0:0019 0:0001
Parameter estimates signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 99% level are in bold
Table 4 The costs of changing employment *
Size classes ￿5 ￿1 +1 +5
Class 1 [10,15[ 0:4 0:4 0:5 0:5
Class 2 [15,25[ 0:6 0:3 0:0 ￿0:6
Class 3 [25,35[ 4:2 0:6 0:0 1:2
Class 4 [35,50[ 4:1 0:8 ￿0:2 ￿0:6
Class 5 [50,75[ 1:1 0:1 0:2 1:0
*The cost are in % terms of 1 yearly wage
One of the main aims of the paper is to provide a test whether the "shocks-
adjustment costs story" versus the "indivisibility- no-adjustment cost story"
is behind the stickiness of employment for small ￿rms and in addition to
provide quantitative estimates on the relative importance of both of them.
The estimated model contains both the e⁄ect of indivisibility and adjust-
ment costs. A key question is: What if adjustment cost would not just be
very small but e⁄ectively zero? What would happen to the frequency of
non-adjustment? The way to disentangle the e⁄ect of indivisibility from the
e⁄ect of adjustment costs on the frequency of non-adjustment is to calculate
the frequency of non-adjustment under di⁄erent parameter assumptions. By
altering the estimated model parameters, especially the adjustment cost pa-
rameters, one can see what happens with the frequency of non-adjustment.
This results of this exercise is shown in Table 5. Table 5 shows what
happens with the frequency of non-adjustment in the estimated model when
certain structural cost parameters are set to zero instead of their estimated
value and all other estimated parameters are left unchanged. Given, the es-
timation of a structural model, the Lucas critique does not apply. When all
adjustment costs are set to zero, one is left with the pure e⁄ect of indivisibil-
ity (conditional though on the variance of the shock process). Table 5 also
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model. The estimated model (including the adjustment costs) matches quite
closely the frequency of non-adjustment in the data for all ￿rm groups. The
last three columns of table 5 show the frequency of non-adjustment upon set-
ting respectively ￿ring cost, hiring cost and all hiring and ￿ring cost to zero
in the estimated model. It has often been argued that the high levels of pro-
tection of workers against ￿ring in Europe would perversely cause ￿rms also
to hire less and therefore cause more sticky employment. Essentially, are the
￿ring costs causing non-adjustment? The di⁄erence in the non-adjustment of
the estimated model and the model with ￿ring cost equal to zero gives an es-
timate of the magnitude purely caused by ￿ring costs. Firing cost are indeed
causing employment to become more sticky than it otherwise would be in the
absence of ￿ring costs. For instance, the smallest ￿rm group would adjust
6.1% more often (39.6%-33.5%) in the absence of ￿ring costs. Nevertheless
still a substantial amount of non-adjustment remain even in the absence of
adjustment costs. This non-adjustment is entirely due to indivisibility. Table
5 shows clearly that indivisibility becomes less and less important as ￿rms
get larger. Where ￿rms of the ￿rst group (10-15 employees) would not ad-
just employment in 27% of the years in the absence of adjustment costs, this
would only be 6.7% for ￿rms of the 5th group (50-75 employees). Indivisi-
bility clearly explains more than 50% of the frequency of non-adjustment for
￿rms below 25 employees.16
Table 5 Frequency of non-adjustment: estimated model versus data
Size classes Data Est. Model Est. Model Est. Model Est. model






Class 1 [10,15[ 40.4 39.6 33.5 32.9 27.2
Class 2 [15,25[ 32.0 29.3 22.3 29.2 22.0
Class 3 [25,35[ 24.9 24.1 11.5 24.3 12.0
Class 4 [35,50[ 22.2 21.4 4.7 26.3 9.9
Class 5 [50,75[ 16.0 15.5 11.7 10.9 6.7
* The Model (adj. cost=0) has the same parameters as the estimated model except all cost parameters are set to zero
16One could ask what happens if one relaxes the assumption that labour input is identical
to the number of employees. I.e. what if 10 employees really are 9 employees and 1
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costs can have large e⁄ects. They induce ￿rms to not adjust employment
as often as they would otherwise. However, in addition, for ￿rms of the
size in this paper, i.e. below 75 employees, other margins of employment
adjustment are necessary to be able to fully react to demand or productivity
shocks. Simply due to indivisibility small ￿rms will often not hire or ￿re.
The existence of ￿xed term contracts does not alter this result. Flexibility in
working hours (even over periods as long as 1 year) are therefore necessary
for those ￿rms to fully exploit pro￿t opportunities that small shocks give
them. However, overtime is generally expensive so that at current juncture
it is unlikely to be a margin that can be used to the full extent. It is possible
that many small ￿rms have (unreported) usage of ￿ unpaid overtime￿or ￿ extra
e⁄ort￿as an answer to the indivisibility problem they face. The results in the
paper clearly show that small ￿rms have a reduced adjustment at the margin
of the number of employees compared to larger ￿rms due to indivisibility.
Adjustment costs do not even seem to be the most important factor for the
smallest ￿rms. The results in this paper also have macro implications. In
France, 10% of manufacturing value added is produced in ￿rms with less
than 20 employees, for services this is even 30% (in construction even 53%).
If demand growth is low (say 1%) these ￿rms will optimally not hire any new
people so that indivisibility is potentially an explanation of periods of jobless
growth. Jobless growth should be more prevalent in countries where small
￿rms are more important in terms of value added. The results in this paper
do beg the question of how small ￿rms do adjust. Much more research is
needed in this respect. Does the indivisibility imply small ￿rms adjust more
on hours or do they adjust more by hiring part-time or temporary workers?
This research however will require much more detailed information on hours
worked, temporary workers hired and so on.
8 CONCLUSION
Small ￿rms frequently do not adjust their employment level from year to
year. Adjustment costs in terms of hiring and ￿ring costs are only part of
the reason. This paper has shown that hiring and ￿ring costs are relatively
small. However small cost do reduce the frequency of adjustment substan-
tially. The smaller ￿rms are, the less often they adjust their employment
level. A substantial fraction of the non-adjustment stems from indivisibil-
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June 2006ity. It does not pay for small ￿rms to react to small shocks to hire or ￿re
individual workers even in the absence of adjustment costs. To what extent
adjustment on other margins such as the hours worked or e⁄ort, given over-
time legislation, provide a pro￿table alternative adjustment mechanism for
small ￿rms remains an open question. Two lessons for policymakers can
be derived. Even the reduction of small adjustment costs (legal severance
payments, e.g.) will induce more ￿ exible hiring and ￿ring in small ￿rms.
Second, such a reduction can not overcome the indivisibility problem small
￿rms face. A ￿ exible adjustment of hours worked is a necessity for small
￿rms to react to productivity or demand shocks.
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I. Relaxing the labour input assumption17
Throughout the paper it is assumed that labour input into production
is identical to the number of employees, i.e. implicitly hours remain ￿xed,
i.e. when small ￿rms adjust labour input, they have to adjust in number of
employees. For instance a ￿rm with 10 employees when faced with a nega-
tive demand shock has the option to either do nothing (i.e. remain with 10
employees) or reduce employment (and hence labour input into production)
with minimum 1 employee. As the paper shows, this induces stickiness.
The estimated model ￿ts the data quite well. But what if ￿rms could adjust
downward (and upward) more smoothly labour input into production, i.e.
assume 10 employees could be adjusted by the ￿rm into labour input into
production of 9.1 or 9.2 or.. 9.9 employees without adjustment cost, but
with reduced pay. For instance imagine a 7% drop in demand and the ￿rm
reduces labour input into production to 9.3 (and its wage bill would become
W9.3 rather than W10). This reduction of labour input to 9.3 would be
equivalent to the following interpretation. The ￿rm would still have 10 em-
ployees (i.e. face no adjustment costs) but would accommodate the negative
demand shock by letting the 10th employee work only for 30% of 40 hours
per week or by letting all 10 employees work for 7% less hours and 7% less
pay ! Whereas the assumption of the equality of the employment level with
the labour input is likely too strict in the model in the paper, in this other
model presented here it is likely too loose, given that a 7% reduction for a
7% reduced pay is not that likely and increasing labour input will generally
also not be costless. So the truth should somewhere lie in the middle. Note
that in terms of adjustment in numbers of employees, a 7% negative demand
shock will have the same implications for the stickiness of the employment
level ! In the case of the model in the paper, the shock is too small to ￿re
1 employee, and so the ￿rm remains at 10 employees. In the case of the
more ￿ exible labour input the ￿rm also remains at 10 employees, but simply
reduces working hours with 7%, so labour input becomes 9.3, employment
stays at 10. So the stickiness of the employment level is not a⁄ected. However
the estimates of the adjustment costs could be a⁄ected.
17This section was inspired by an anonymous referee.
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group for which such ￿ exibility would be most relevant) to test how much
on the one hand the adjustment cost and on the other hand the frequency of
non-adjustment (in terms of numbers of employees level) would be a⁄ected.
The assumptions of that model are identical to the model in the paper
with two exceptions. First a ￿rm with x employees can adjust downwards
(without adjustment costs) up to an labour input level of (x-1)+0.1 (e.g.
from 15 to 14.1) in steps of 0.1 with reduced pay (i.e. instead of W15 ,
W14.1) and can adjust upwards (without adjustment costs) from (x-1)+0.1
to x with increased pay (but no overtime pay). Otherwise said, 10 employees
can costlessly adjust labour input in the set {9.1,9.2,...10}, 11 employees can
adjust costlessly labour input in the set {10.1, 10.2, 10.3, ...11}. E.g. in
the new model the ￿rm does not incur adjustment costs when adjusting its
labour input in the following fashion { 9.5 9.2 9.7 9.9 10 9.1 9.4}, but will
incur adjustment costs when adjusting e.g. from 9.4 to 10.4 (i.e. in the ￿rst
case it has 10 employees in the second 11 employees).18
The results are as following. The structural parameters of production
and demand hardly change. The adjustment cost parameters do change
signi￿cantly however. However they remain very low and imply similar order
of magnitudes of costs. Whereas hiring cost of hiring 1 employee was 0.5% it
is now 0.1%. The costs of hiring 5 employees was 0.5% it is now 1.7%. The
costs of ￿ring one employees was 0.4%, it is now 0.1%, similarly the cost of
￿ring 5 employees was 0.4% and is now 0.1%. There is a clear reduction in the
adjustment costs up or down of 1 employee. The intuition for this result is as
follows. The ￿rm can now adjust labour input without incurring adjustment
costs (e.g. where a ￿rm with 10 employees could simply produce with a
labour input of 10 the ￿rm can now produce with labour input of 9.1,9.2,9.3
etc. up to 10). This induces the ￿rm to remain with its number of employees
and adjust labour input (costlessly) rather than number of employees (which
induces adjustment costs) whenever it can. Clearly, for larger shocks the
￿rm still cannot avoid to hire and ￿re at least one employee. To match
the non-adjustment frequency in the data, with this additional ￿ exibility of
labour input, the adjustment costs of hiring and ￿ring 1 employees must be
18One has to obviously bound the costless ￿ exibility of labour input somewhere. In this
exercise the boundaries for each employment level have been chosen relatively wide to
provide a good test of the relaxation of the labour input assumption.
37
ECB
Working Paper Series No 640
June 2006
lower.1920Table 6 Structural Parameters Adjustment Costs (with relaxed labour input assumption)
Size classes Hf Hl Hc F f F l F c
Class 1 [10,15[ 0:0015 ￿ ￿ -0:002 0:001￿ 0:0003 0:0006 ￿0:0001
** Signi￿cant at 10% level * Signi￿cant at 5% level
What happens to the frequency of non-adjustment when adjustment costs
are set to zero in this model? Very similar results to table 5 are obtained.
When removing adjustment costs, the non-adjustment frequency would drop
to 25 (whereas it was 27 in the model in the paper). One can conclude that
relaxing the strict labour input assumption in the paper does not seem to
alter the results dramatically.
Table 7 Frequency of non-adjustment: estimated model versus data







Class 1 [10,15[ 40.4 37 25
II. Construction of the dataset
The dataset was constructed using the AMADEUS database. This data-
base contains balance sheet statement and pro￿t and loss accounts of Euro-
pean ￿rms. First all French manufacturing ￿rms were selected. From this
19There is another way of con￿rming the same idea. When simulating the model with
relaxed labour input with the parameter estimates of the original (non-relaxed) model for
group 1 (i.e. those of table 3 and 4), the frequency of non-adjustment should increase.
Indeed it does. The frequency of non-adjustment jumps to 55% (from 40%). The ￿rm
now simply uses the additional costless ￿ exibility in labour input to not adjust its number
of employees.
20An interesting example of a ￿rm that has tried to avoid hiring and ￿ring by adapting
a ￿ exible working hours mechanism through using a work-time account is the car maker
BMW. BMW states that "Based on the principle of varying working hours according to
workload, the balance on a work time account can range between plus or minus 200 hours,
which can be evened out over the course of several years." Interestingly it con￿rms the
￿nding here that additional ￿ exibility at the hours level induces more stickyness at the
employment level and that there is a clear trade-o⁄. "The virtually unlimited accounting
period allows more uniform development of the size of the workforce. It also helps to
reduce costs in manufacturing operations, above all by eliminating personnel costs for
surplus sta⁄. Cost savings are also achieved with regard to the recruitment and layo⁄ of
sta⁄ and ￿due to marginal ￿ uctuation￿through lower training costs." (BMW,Flexible
working hours at the BMW group.)
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stock for 9 years were kept. To make sure that the selected ￿rms were truly
plants and not headquarters without a physical plant, ￿rms that had more
than 50% of ￿xed assets under a di⁄erent form as tangible assets (i.e ￿nancial
￿xed assets, which are equity in other ￿rms) were dropped. Firms were also
dropped if they had a large outlier observation in the 9 year period. The
outliers were de￿ned as a growth rate of more than 200% in employment in
a given year, a growth rate of sales more than 200% in a given year. Further,
￿rms which employment grew more than 60% over the whole period were
removed. This last criterion is done as the model in the paper has a long run
stationary employment level of the ￿rm as it solution. This paper is therefore
not able to say anything on the relationship between long run ￿rm growth
and adjustment costs. This would imply a di⁄erent type of analysis.
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